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Inter-Organizational Imitation and Acquisitions of High-Tech Ventures 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper suggests and finds that there is a positive association between the changes in the number 
of prior acquisitions (the changes in the prominence of prior acquirers) within the focal venture’s 
subfield and the venture’s likelihood to be acquired. Results are in line with the existence of 
frequency and trait based imitation in acquisitions targeting tech ventures. More importantly, we 
suggest and show that these positive associations are more pronounced when (i) the exogenous 
technological uncertainty within the venture’s subfield increases and (ii) there is high difference 
between the focal venture’s and acquirer’s technological resources. Our findings are in accord with 
the suggestion that uncertainty in the technology domain might be an important boundary 
condition in moderating the extent of frequency- and trait-based imitation in technology 
acquisitions. We discuss alternative explanations for the above associations and related robustness 
tests in detail. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is well known that technology ventures (or simply ventures, henceforth) present uncertainty to 
potential acquirers given that these ventures generally lack established track records, are privately 
held, and their knowledge resources are tacit (e.g., Amit, Glosten, and Muller, 1990; Ransbotham 
and Mitra, 2010; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999). Faced with such uncertainties, potential 
acquirers may not acquire a venture, and deals that would be valuable for acquirers and targets 
alike may fail to occur (e.g., Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006; Shane and Cable, 2002). It is therefore 
important to investigate the factors that can facilitate acquisitions of ventures (Arikan, 2005; 
Arikan and Capron, 2010; Arikan and McGahan, 2010; Brau, Francis, and Kohers, 2003; 
DeTienne, 2010; Sanders and Boivie, 2004). 
When faced with uncertainty, potential acquirers may be substantially influenced by other 
firms’ actions and hence imitate previous acquisitions by others (e.g., Lieberman and Asaba, 2006). 
In this paper, we first analyze frequency- and trait-based imitation (Haunschild and Miner, 1997) 
in acquisitions involving technology ventures. Specifically, we first suggest that there is a positive 
within subfield level association between (i) the changes in the number of acquisitions targeting 
the focal venture’s rivals in the subfield, and (ii) the changes in the prominence of acquirers in 
such acquisitions, and the venture’s likelihood to be acquired (in line with frequency and trait 
based imitation, respectively).  
Even though previous studies show that when there is higher uncertainty imitation is more 
likely to occur (e.g., Lieberman and Asaba, 2006), such studies focus on the uncertainty pertaining 
to non-tech industries as well as sources of uncertainty relevant to established, public companies 
(e.g., Haunschild and Miner, 1997). For example, imitation studies have considered the roles 
played by policy-related uncertainties in international investments or dispersion in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts in amplifying imitation in M&A behavior (e.g., Haunschild and Miner, 1997; 
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Henisz and Delios, 2001). However, research has yet to attend to the dimensions of uncertainty 
that might be especially relevant for tech ventures and hence might particularly affect the extent 
of imitation within a subfield regarding the acquisitions of tech ventures. Considering that the 
value of a tech venture’s resources, capabilities, and prospects is closely associated with the tech 
venture’s activities in the technology domain, technology-related dimensions of uncertainty might 
be especially relevant for acquirers of tech ventures (Folta, 1998; Mitchell, 1988; Anderson and 
Tushman, 2001).  
By focusing on technology-related uncertainty, we expand the types of uncertainty that 
might moderate imitative behavior and hence intensify the positive association between the 
changes in acquisition activity within a tech venture’s subfield and the future acquisition activity 
within the subfield. For this purpose, we first introduce exogenous technological uncertainty 
within the focal tech venture’s industry subfield as a critical dimension of technological 
uncertainty. This uncertainty reflects the uncertainty in the technological landscape of the focal 
venture’s subfield that is unaffected by the venture’s own actions (Folta, 1998; Mitchell, 1988). 
Specifically, we first suggest that as the exogenous technological uncertainty within the focal 
venture’s subfield increases over time, there is a more positive association between the changes in 
the number of acquisitions within the focal venture’s subfield (changes in the prominence of 
acquirers in these acquisitions) and the venture’s own likelihood to be acquired.  
Second, we suggest that technological distance between the focal venture and its acquirer 
is another important boundary condition on the extent of imitation in technology acquisitions. 
Previous studies on imitation in acquisition markets have mainly focused on public targets and 
related dispersion in analysts’ earnings estimates when analyzing the moderating role of 
transaction specific uncertainty on potential imitative behavior in M&As. However, this type of 
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transaction-specific uncertainty cannot be applied to tech ventures as they are private companies, 
for which a significant portion of M&A activity occurs. Tech distance represents the differences 
between the venture’s and its acquirer’s technological resources and knowledge bases (Fleming, 
2001; Folta, 1998). As a result, tech distance limits the acquirer’s ability to understand and assess 
the target’s underlying technological resources (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Therefore the 
technological distance between bidders and targets is apt to be one of the most important factors 
that might contribute to the transaction specific uncertainty faced by the acquirers of tech ventures 
(Folta, 1998; Levitt and March, 1988). This lack of technical information and understanding of the 
target’s resources, in turn, might increase the acquirer’s receptivity to the social information 
conveyed by other acquisitions within a subfield and hence increase the likelihood of imitation.  
Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that positive associations between the changes in the 
number of prior acquisitions (changes in acquirer prominence) within a focal tech venture’s 
subfield and the tech venture’s own likelihood to be acquired is more pronounced when the tech 
distance between the focal venture and its acquirer is high.  
Instead of suggesting a causal relationship, in this paper we suggest a positive association 
between the changes in the number of prior acquisitions within a venture’s subfield through time 
(changes in the prominence of prior acquirers) and the venture’s likelihood to be acquired. In 
addition, while our findings are consistent with theoretical suggestions on imitative behavior, 
M&A activities we observed might be influenced by a number of alternative explanations that we 
explore through various control variables and robustness analyses. Hence, we cautiously suggest 
that our findings are in line with the imitation-related hypotheses that we have presented even 
though alternative mechanisms are also plausible. 
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Inasmuch as our findings are consistent with social influence and imitative behavior, our 
study complements previous M&A-related studies considering how firms select alternative deal 
structures (e.g., Chari and Chang, 2009; Malhotra and Gaur, 2013) or organizational forms (e.g., 
Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Folta, 1998; Vanhaverbeke, Duysters, and Noorderhaven, 2003; 
Wang and Zajac, 2007) to deal with technological uncertainty. We also build upon and extend 
studies in corporate strategy and finance on imitation in M&A decisions involving targets other 
than privately-held tech ventures that are subject to different types of uncertainty (c.f., Chatterjee, 
1986; Eckbo, 1983; Song and Walkling, 2000). Even more broadly, our paper also contributes to 
and extends prior studies on entrepreneurship and research on interfirm transactions by presenting 
new theoretical arguments and findings in line with the suggestion that imitation can be an 
important means by which potential exchange partners deal with the technology related uncertainty 
they are facing when transacting with tech ventures (e.g., Gaba and Terlaak, 2013).  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Frequency-Based Imitation for Acquisitions of Ventures 
Acquisitions of technology ventures have become an essential means by which established firms 
can obtain new technological knowledge, access new products, and upgrade their technological 
assets (e.g., Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Puranam, Singh, and Chaudhuri, 2009). However, technology 
ventures typically entail high uncertainty because they do not have established track records or 
even products (e.g., Shane and Cable, 2002; Stuart et al., 1999). As a result, potential acquirers of 
a technology venture might face substantial uncertainty regarding the quality of the venture’s 
resources and its prospects when they are assessing the venture as an acquisition target (e.g., Stuart 
et al., 1999). In the presence of uncertainty, potential acquirers might be influenced by other firms’ 
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actions within the focal venture’s subfield when making acquisition decisions. One important 
social influence factor is the previous actions of other firms that have carried out similar 
acquisitions in the past (e.g., Lieberman and Asaba, 2006; Haunschild and Miner, 1997).  
In particular, we first suggest that potential acquirer of a tech venture might engage in 
frequency-based imitation within the venture’s subfield as a means of coping with the 
technological uncertainty surrounding its acquisition decision (e.g., Garcia-Pont and Nohria, 2002; 
Haunschild and Miner, 1997; Lieberman and Asaba, 2006). Previous studies suggest that 
frequency-based imitation occurs when firms imitate the actions conducted by a large number of 
other firms (Haunschild and Miner, 1997). There might be various reasons for such imitation in 
acquisition decisions. First, potential acquirers may infer relevant information cues about the 
opportunities for acquisitions by observing the acquisitions conducted by other firms –such as the 
acquisitions targeting a focal venture’s rivals within the venture’s subfield (e.g., Haunschild and 
Miner, 1997; Lieberman and Asaba, 2006). Second, legitimacy might be another possible 
motivator for imitation, whereby an action becomes taken-for-granted or institutionalized once a 
number of other firms take similar actions. For instance, Lieberman and Asaba (2006) note that 
legitimation is an important concept, “where once a threshold number of model actions occur, this 
institutionalizes, or legitimizes, the action and leads to further imitation” (p.372).  
Previous studies report findings that are in line with frequency based imitation. For instance, 
Haunschild and Miner (1997) show that the number of other firms that hire a particular investment 
bank in their acquisitions, is positively related to the likelihood that the focal acquirer will hire this 
particular investment bank. The frequency of previous adopters is also shown to be associated with 
increases in a firm’s likelihood of pursuing a diversification strategy (Fligstein, 1991), forming 
alliances (Garcia-Pont and Nohria, 2002), entering new product or geographic markets (e.g., 
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Belderbos et al., 2011; Guillén, 2002; Henisz and Delios, 2001), or exiting from an industry (Gaba 
and Terlaak, 2013). 
For a model firm’s actions to influence a potential imitator, the model firm’s actions must 
be seen as sufficiently similar to those of the imitator (e.g., Belderbos et al., 2011; Garcia-Pont and 
Nohria, 2002; Guillen, 2002). In high tech industries, firms that operate within the same industry 
subfield, i.e., firms that are rivals, are more likely to work on similar technologies and products in 
comparison to firms across different subfields (e.g., DiMasi 2001; DiMasi, Feldman, Secker, and 
Wilson, 2010; Pisano, 1990). Consequently, we focus on the within-subfield level imitation in a 
focal tech venture’s subfield and define the model acquisitions as the previous acquisitions 
targeting the other ventures, i.e. focal venture’s rivals, within the focal venture’s subfield. (For 
brevity, we also refer to model acquisitions as “previous acquisitions in the focal venture’s 
subfield”). In particular, within the focal venture’s subfield, frequency based imitation would occur 
if the focal venture’s potential acquirers observe the previous acquisitions in the venture’s subfield 
targeting the focal venture’s rivals, and imitate these acquisitions by acquiring the focal venture. 
We therefore specify the following baseline hypothesis for within-subfield level frequency-based 
imitation: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  There is a positive association between the changes in the number of prior 
acquirers within the focal venture’s subfield targeting the venture’s rivals and the 
focal venture’s likelihood of being acquired. 
 
 
 
Trait-Based Imitation and Acquisitions of Ventures 
 
Trait-based imitation is a more selective imitation mechanism than frequency-based imitation 
(Haunschild and Miner, 1997), wherein certain characteristics of the model firms affect the extent 
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of imitation. In particular, previous studies suggest that successful or larger firms are more likely 
to be imitated because such firms might be “perceived as likely to have superior information” (e.g., 
Lieberman and Asaba, 2006, p. 371).  Previous studies also suggest that the actions of successful 
firms might legitimize such actions and further facilitate imitation. For instance, Lieberman and 
Asaba (2006) point out that successful retailers’ activities in online retailing helped “legitimize” 
the efforts of other firms in online retailing and hence facilitated imitation.  
Haunschild and Miner (1997) show that the size and success of previous acquirers hiring a 
particular investment banker is positively associated with the likelihood that the focal acquiring 
firm hires this particular investment banker, and they suggest that this association occurs due to 
trait-based imitation. Various other studies also provide related findings that are in line with trait-
based imitation. Williamson and Cable (2003), for instance, show that there is a positive 
association between the size of the previous firms that have hired from a particular source, and 
other firms’ likelihood to hire from the same source. Strang and Tuma (1993) show that the 
prestige, size, or success of model firms undertaking a particular practice is positively associated 
with the likelihood that others will engage in similar actions. These studies suggest that the 
prominence of the model firms as indicated by the model firms’ size or profitability can be an 
important trait that can lead to imitation (Haunschild and Miner, 1997; Lieberman and Asaba, 
2006).  This indicates that if potential acquirers within a focal venture’s subfield engage in trait-
based imitation regarding whether or not to acquire the focal venture, then potential acquirers 
would attach more importance to acquisitions within the venture’s subfield that are conducted by 
prominent acquirers. So, we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2:  There is a positive association between the changes in the prominence of prior 
acquirers within the focal venture’s subfield targeting the venture’s rivals, and the 
focal venture’s likelihood of being acquired. 
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Technological Uncertainty as a Contingency Shaping Imitation within Subfields  
While above hypotheses specify baseline predictions for frequency- and trait-based 
imitation for technology ventures, our primary aim is to consider the role of the changes in the 
level of technology-related uncertainty within-the focal venture’s subfield as a potential 
contingency shaping imitation for acquisitions of tech ventures. In broad terms, uncertainty refers 
to a firm not knowing exactly which state of the world will emerge looking forward (Arrow 1974; 
McGrath, 1997; Radner, 1968), and researchers have long noted that firms seek ways to cope with 
uncertainty surrounding their decisions (Cyert and March, 1963; Thompson, 1967). It is suggested 
that when the uncertainty a firm faces regarding a particular decision increases through time, the 
firm’s managers are more likely to look at other firms’ actions for clues regarding appropriate 
managerial decisions (Lieberman and Asaba, 2006). More specifically, it is well accepted that, as 
uncertainty increases within a particular environment, social considerations become more 
important for firm behavior (e.g., Festinger, 1954; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Abrahamson and 
Rosenkopf, 1993).  
Even though uncertainty in general is shown to moderate the extent of mimetic behavior, 
we expect that uncertainty in the technology domain can be particularly important in moderating 
the extent of imitation in acquisitions where technology ventures are acquisition targets (Stuart, 
1998; Stuart, et al., 1999; Folta, 1998). As a consequence, in the following sections, we focus on 
two types of technology-related uncertainty, namely (i) exogenous technological uncertainty 
within the focal venture’s subfield, and (ii) the transaction-specific uncertainty associated with the 
technological distance between the focal venture and its acquirer as important boundary conditions 
for frequency- and trait-based imitation for acquisitions involving technology ventures.  
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Exogenous technological uncertainty in a venture’s subfield and imitation 
Exogenous technological uncertainty (or exogenous tech uncertainty) is defined as 
uncertainty related to the technological environment in a venture’s industry subfield that is largely 
unaffected by the venture’s own actions (Mitchell, 1988). Exogenous tech uncertainty is highly 
related to the extent to which the technological landscape in a venture’s subfield might change 
unexpectedly in the future (e.g., Anderson and Tushman, 2001; Mitchell, 1988; Oriani and Sobrero 
2008). Relatedly, when exogenous tech uncertainty within a venture’s subfield increases through 
time, it becomes more difficult to estimate or form expectations regarding which technology will 
emerge and potentially dominate the venture’s environment (Anderson and Tushman, 2001). 
Above discussion suggests that as exogenous tech uncertainty within a focal tech venture’s 
subfield increases through time, it will be more difficult to assess which capabilities, or what kind 
of technologies will be critical for future success within this particular subfield (e.g., Mitchell, 
1988). Hence, exogenous tech uncertainty within a focal tech venture’s subfield can be a critical 
dimension of uncertainty perceived by the venture’s potential acquirers when assessing the value 
of the focal venture as a potential acquisition target (Folta, 1998).  
Hence, based on the above discussion, we suggest that when the exogenous tech 
uncertainty within the focal venture’s subfield increases through time, the positive within-subfield 
level association between the changes in the number of prior acquisitions (the changes in the 
prominence of prior acquirers) targeting the focal venture’s rivals within the venture’s subfield 
and the focal venture’s own likelihood to be acquired is more pronounced (Lieberman and Asaba, 
2006). Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The positive association between the changes in the number of prior acquisitions 
within the focal venture’s subfield targeting the venture’s rivals, and the venture’s 
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likelihood to be acquired, is more pronounced when exogenous tech uncertainty 
within the subfield increases. 
 
 
Hypothesis 4: The positive association between the changes in the prominence of prior acquirers 
within the focal venture’s subfield targeting the venture’s rivals, and the venture’s 
likelihood to be acquired, is more pronounced when exogenous tech uncertainty 
within the subfield increases. 
 
 
Technological distance between acquirer and the focal tech venture, and imitation 
Differences in the technological resources of an acquirer and a tech venture represent 
another important source of technology-related uncertainty for the acquirer, which can moderate 
the extent of association between the changes in the number of prior acquisitions (prominence of 
prior acquirers) in the venture’s subfield and the venture’s likelihood to be acquired. 
Previous studies show that when firms face higher transaction specific uncertainty 
associated with acquiring a particular target, firms are more likely to be influenced by others’ 
actions and hence more likely to imitate them (Haunschild and Miner, 1997). To incorporate 
transaction specific uncertainty, Haunschild and Miner (1997) focus on the variation in analysts’ 
estimates of the target’s earnings. However, this type of uncertainty does not apply to the 
acquisitions involving non-public targets.  
One of the most important dimensions of uncertainty associated with economic exchanges 
in high tech contexts is the transaction-specific uncertainty stemming from the differences between 
the underlying technological resources of the firms (Folta, 1998; Makti et al., 2010; Lane and 
Lubatkin, 1998). In particular, technological distance (or tech distance) between two firms reflects 
the extent to which the underlying technologies and the knowledge bases of the firms are different 
(e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Folta, 1998; Makri, Hitt, and Lane, 2010). When tech distance is low, firms 
tend to be more similar to each other in terms of the underlying technological resources and 
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knowledge base they have been utilizing (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Makti et al., 2010). Above 
discussion suggest that if the tech distance between the acquirer and the tech venture is low, the 
acquirer has better information and understanding about the knowledge base of the venture and its 
technology (Ahuja, 2000; Gilsing, et al., 2008; Stuart, 1998). This, in turns makes it easier for the 
acquirer to understand the assumptions that shape the focal venture’s knowledge and related cause-
effect relationships (Ahuja, 2000; Fleming, 2001; Stuart, 1998). As a result, an acquirer is better 
able to define the set of criteria to assess the possible outcomes of integrating and utilizing the 
focal venture’s technology (Fleming, 2001; Stuart, 1998).  
On the other hand, when there is high tech distance between the focal venture and its 
potential acquirer, the potential acquirer does not have much information, or understanding of the 
associated costs, risks, or benefits of acquiring the focal venture (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Makti 
et al., 2010). Therefore, when an acquirer is assessing a technologically distant venture, the 
acquirer does not have as much information, or understanding regarding what kind of criteria to 
use to assess the value of the venture as an acquisition target (e.g., Folta, 1998; Lane and Lubatkin, 
1998). This, in turn increases the transaction-specific uncertainty regarding the possible outcomes 
of acquiring the focal venture (e.g., Folta, 1998; Haunschild and Miner, 1997; Levitt and March, 
1988).  
Previous studies on social influence and imitation suggest that when a firm has relevant 
information, or understanding to assess a potential action, (and relatedly faces less transaction-
specific uncertainty) the firm is more likely to act based on its own understanding and knowledge 
(Belderbos et al., 2011; Henisz and Delios, 2001). Under these conditions, marginal value of the 
social information inferred from others’ actions is lower; decreasing the firm’s likelihood of 
imitation (Haunschild and Miner, 1997; Belderbos et al., 2011; Henisz and Delios, 2001).  
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On the other hand, when the firm lacks relevant information and understanding to assess 
the factors that might affect the outcome of a particular action, the firm faces higher transaction 
specific uncertainty (Belderbos et al., 2011; Haunshcild and Miner, 1997; Henisz and Delios, 
2001). Under these conditions the firm is more inclined to use the “social information” inferred 
from observing the others’ actions and hence is more likely to engage in imitation (Galaskiewicz 
and Burt, 1991; Haunshcild and Miner, 1997; Henisz and Delios, 2001). Supporting above 
arguments, it is shown that when a firm lacks sufficient information and knowledge regarding 
investing in a particular country, the firm relies in a greater extent on the social information 
inferred from others’ actions when making such investment decisions (Henisz and Delios, 2001; 
Belderbos et. al., 2011). Consistent with this view, Lieberman and Asaba (2006) emphasize that 
when firms have more difficulties in understanding the full range of potential consequences of 
their actions, firms are more perceptive to the information cues implicit in the actions of other 
firms, which facilitates the extent of imitation.  
Above discussion suggests that in high-tech distance acquisitions, to the extent that the 
focal venture’s acquirer lacks sufficient information and understanding to assess the possible 
outcomes of integrating and utilizing the venture’s technology, the venture’s acquirer is more 
likely to be influenced by the social information inferred from the previous acquisitions within the 
venture’s subfield (Haunschild and Miner, 1997; Galaskiewicz and Burt, 1991). This suggests that 
the associations captured in our baseline hypotheses will be amplified for high-tech distance 
acquisitions, where acquirers face higher transaction specific uncertainty, in comparison to low 
tech distance acquisitions.  Therefore:  
Hypothesis 5: The positive association between the changes in the number of previous acquisitions 
within the focal venture’s subfield targeting the venture’s rivals, and the likelihood 
that the venture is acquired is more pronounced when the technological distance 
between the focal venture and its acquirer is high.  
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Hypothesis 6:  The positive association between the changes in the prominence of previous 
acquirers within the focal venture’s subfield targeting the venture’s rivals, and the 
likelihood that the venture is acquired is more pronounced when the technological 
distance between the focal venture and its acquirer is high.  
 
Alternative Explanations 
There are some alternative mechanisms that might also suggest the hypotheses we have 
listed in our theory section. Relatedly, we want to emphasize that our hypotheses and related results 
should be interpreted as only suggestive of imitation and that there are alternative explanations 
that should be investigated in future research. In particular, apart from imitation, two main types 
of alternative explanations might be provided for our findings: (i) homophily, or similarity between 
the focal venture’s acquirer and prior acquirers within the venture’s subfield, and (ii) similarity in 
macroeconomic conditions faced by the focal venture’s acquirer and prior acquirers within the 
venture’s subfield.  
Homophily. It is widely shown that similarity among individuals may make them more 
inclined toward higher levels of social affiliations in comparison to the levels expected by the 
individuals who do not have such similar attributes (e.g., Ruef et al., 2003). This mechanism is 
widely known as “homophily”. Kossinets and Watz (2009) summarize homophily principle as 
“like to associate with like….Friends, spouses, romantic partners, co-workers, colleagues, and 
other professional and recreational associates all tend to be more similar to each other than 
randomly chosen members of the same population with respect to a variety of dimensions, 
including race, age, gender, socioeconomic status, and education” (Kossinets and Watz, 2009, 
page 405-406). Relatedly, homophily associated with various characteristics is shown to affect 
group and team formation and the communication between individuals (Kossinets and Wattz, 
2009), as well as the formation of various relationships such as friendship, marriage (Kossinets 
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and Watz, 2009; McPherson et al., 2001; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987) and the formation of 
teams (Ruef et al., 2003).  
Even though prior studies on homophily predominantly focus on the behaviors of 
individuals, the phenomenon might be also extended to the behaviors of the firms. In particular, 
firms with similar characteristics might face similar set of opportunities or be constrained in similar 
ways (Ahuja et al., 2009; Kossinets and Wattz, 2009). This discussion suggests that due to the 
similarities between the focal venture’s potential acquirer and the previous acquires in the 
venture’s subfield, the potential acquirer and prior acquirers might face similar opportunity sets, 
and consequently might make similar decisions regarding what type of targets to acquire 
(Kossinets and Watts, 2009; McPherson et al., 2001), even if there is no social influence or 
imitation per se.  
Macroeconomic conditions. One of the dimensions of similarity among firms is the 
similarity in the firms’ external environment, which might induce the firms to act in similar ways 
without social influence (e.g.,; Ahuja et al., 2009; Harford, 2005; Van de Bulte and Lilien, 2001). 
In particular, firms might act in similar ways not because they are influenced by each other, but 
because they are exposed to the same macroeconomic shocks (e.g., Haunschild, 1993; Harford, 
2005; Van den Bulte and Lilien, 2001). This suggests that the focal venture’s acquirer and the prior 
acquirers in the focal venture’s subfield might be simply exposed to similar macroeconomic shocks, 
or aggregate trends, and as a result they might have responded in similar ways in their acquisition 
decisions.  
Finally, a distinct alternative explanation related to the M&A context is that variations in 
the number of ventures within a subfield over time might shape the availability of ventures in the 
M&A market, which can affect the variations in previous acquisition activity within the venture’s 
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subfield as well as the venture’s likelihood of being acquired. We therefore conduct a number of 
empirical analyses and robustness tests to incorporate above alternative explanations. 
 
METHODS 
Sample and Data 
In empirical analyses, we focus on the acquisitions in the biotechnology industry, given 
the high-technology nature of this industry as well as the prevalence of acquisitions targeting the 
biotechnology (i.e., tech) ventures (e.g., Ozmel, Robinson, Stuart, 2013). The sample consists of 
venture capital-backed ventures that received their first venture funding between 1980 and 2004, 
because VentureXpert’s data is less complete prior to 1980. For this research, data is drawn from 
Thomson Reuters’ VentureXpert database, which has been extensively used in prior research and 
has been shown to be a comprehensive database containing clear descriptions of venture financing 
(e.g., Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens, 1990; Katila, Rosenberger, and Eisenhardt, 2008; 
Lerner, 1995; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001).  
We also used VentureXpert’s classification for industry subgroups and assigned the sample 
into seven subfields: Biosensors, Biotech Equipment, Biotech Research, Biotech Animal, Biotech 
Human, Biotech Industrial, and Biotech Other. We collected data on all acquisitions of private 
firms in the sample from the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) module of Thomson Reuters’ SDC 
database. We also excluded acquisitions that were coded as buyouts, divestitures, restructurings, 
recapitalizations, carveouts, and liquidations (e.g., Haunschild, 1993). Our final sample consisted 
of a total number of 1,369 ventures, of which 133 were acquired during our observation period. 
Analytical Approach 
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We analyzed the likelihood of a technology venture being acquired in a given year with a 
hazard rate model, which allows analysis of both the timing and the occurrence of an event by 
incorporating longitudinal data with time-varying covariates (Allison, 1995). A given technology 
venture is at risk of acquisition when it received the first investment from venture capitalists (VCs) 
and remains at risk until it is sold to an acquirer, or does IPO, or reaches the end of the observation 
period. In general, hazard rate models can effectively handle right-censored data and the competing 
risks described below, thereby increasing the precision of estimates and reducing estimation biases.  
Our hypotheses pertain to within-subfield estimations of the relation between the changes 
in the subfield level acquisition activity and the venture’s likelihood to be acquired. To attain 
within-subfield estimates, we have conducted Cox Proportional Hazard models with subfield fixed 
effects following Allison (2009) and Greene (2001). The advantage of using within-subfield 
analysis is that, within subfield models are less likely to suffer from omitted variable bias (Allison, 
2009) because such models incorporate the subfield level time invariant factors (Greene, 2001). 
Hence Cox proportional hazard models with subfield fixed effects is an appropriate approach for 
our analyses (Allison, 1995, 2009). We use below model: 
(1) hi  (t, X) = h0 (t) exp{Xβ}, 
where the hazard rate function hi(t,X) for a focal tech venture i is the product of an unspecified 
baseline function, h0(t), which corresponds to the probability of an event when all the explanatory 
variables are zero, X is the vector of the independent variables with values specified at time t, and 
incorporates subfield fixed effects.  Finally, β is the vector of the estimated regression coefficients. 
This formulation offers the advantage that differences in hazard rates across technology ventures 
depend only on the covariates, not on the baseline hazard. As a result, the Cox model assumes that 
the hazard ratio at different levels of an independent variables is proportional to an unspecified 
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baseline function. To check this proportionality assumption, we examined the Schoenfeld residuals 
as a function of time, and found that there was no evidence that the proportional hazards 
assumption was violated in our study. The coefficients were estimated by partial likelihood 
estimation. Because there were multiple spells observed for the same technology venture, 
observations in the sample might not be independent. We therefore calculated robust standard 
errors, clustering residuals for each venture (Lin and Wei, 1989). As a robustness check, we also 
estimated exponential hazard models and found that the results were similar to those reported 
below.            
Year dummies. In all our within-subfield models, in addition to the various control variables 
described below, we also include year dummies in order to control for the effect of unobserved 
aggregate trends or macro level factors (Wooldridge, 2010). If there are aggregate trends that are 
associated with both the changes in the prior acquisition activity (acquirer prominence) within a 
venture’s subfield, and the venture’s likelihood of being acquired; omitting such factors or trends 
might result in biased coefficient estimates (Wooldridge, 2010). In particular, the role of external 
aggregate factors in social contagion processes and in imitation is discussed in many studies. For 
instance, Haunschild (1993) emphasize that when the aggregate factors that grow over time and 
that affect the adoption of an innovation are excluded from the models, the positive observed 
relationship between the prevalence of the prior adoption of a practice and the likelihood of an 
agent’s adoption of the practice might be produced by trends in some aggregate factors. Hence, it 
is strongly suggested that the effect of aggregate time trends is controlled for when analyzing the 
social influence processes (e.g., Haunschild, 1993; Van den Bulte and Lilien, 2001). Year dummies 
help us incorporate the changes in unobservable aggregate factors that might be correlated with 
the observed association between the changes in prior acquisition activity (acquirer prominence) 
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within a venture’s subfield and the venture’s likelihood to be acquired (Ahuja et al., 2009; 
Garciapont and Nohria, 2003; Haunschild, 1993; Van den Bulte and Lilien, 2001; Wooldridge, 
2010).    
Variables and Measurement 
Dependent variable. The dependent variable is the hazard of the focal venture being 
acquired in a given year. M&A Event is thus denoted as whether or not the venture became the 
target of an acquisition in each spell. Ventures that were still operating independently without 
being acquired at the endpoint of the sample period were treated as right censored. In addition, we 
avoid the loss of timing information by treating two other events as competing risks. Specifically, 
we distinguished ventures that acquired resources by undertaking an IPO (e.g., DeTienne, 2010; 
Waguespack and Fleming, 2009) and those becoming “living dead,” or not obtaining additional 
VC funding for at least seven years due to low financial returns (e.g., Mason and Harrison, 2002; 
Ruhnka, Feldman, and Dean, 1992). Furthermore, in testing Hypotheses 5 and 6, we separated the 
M&A Event variable into two competing risks based on the median value of the technological 
distance between the acquirer and the venture to determine if imitation effects are more 
pronounced when technological distance is greater between acquirers and targets.   
Independent variables. We examined M&A announcements in each industry subfield and 
measured the number of prior acquisitions in the venture’s subfield targeting the venture’s rivals, 
i.e., “the number of prior acquisitions in the subfield”, which is equal to the number of prior 
acquisitions targeting the venture’s rivals during the past three years. (Please note that, as we 
mention in the Theory section, when we refer to “prior acquisitions in the venture’s subfield”, we 
always refer to the prior acquisitions in the venture’s subfield targeting the venture’s rivals). Since 
this variable exhibited positive skewness, we transformed this count measure by taking the log of 
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one plus the number of rivals’ acquisitions. In robustness tests, we also examined number of prior 
acquisitions in the venture’s subfield by reducing the timeframe to one year or expanding it to five 
years, and obtained qualitatively similar results. Our second theoretical variable is “the prominence 
of prior acquirers in the venture’s subfield –targeting the venture’s rivals-“. To identify prominent 
acquirers in those transactions and examine trait-based imitation, we used several alternative 
measures. First, we followed Haunschild and Miner (1997) by using the average return on equity 
of prior acquirers to operationalize the prominence of prior acquirers in the venture’s subfield, and 
the return on equity is defined as net income divided by total equity (i.e., Acquirer Prominence–
ROE). Second, also following Haunschild and Miner (1997), we used the average total assets of 
prior acquirers in the venture’s subfield (i.e., Acquirer Prominence – Total Assets). In 
supplementary analyses, we also used the Number of Employees of the prior Acquirers and 
Number of prior acquirers among S&P 500 Firms (e.g., Chen, Hambrick, and Pollock, 2008; 
Pollock, Chen, Jackson, and Hambrick, 2010) as alternative measures of the prominence of prior 
acquirers in the venture’s subfield targeting the venture’s rivals, again using logarithmic 
transformations. We obtained very similar results as those reported.  
 We follow prior research and measure the exogenous technological uncertainty in the 
venture’s subfield by calculating the monthly standard deviation of the returns for each biotech 
industry subfield index composed of publicly traded biotech firms (e.g., Folta, 1998; Vassolo, 
Anand, and Folta, 2004). To capture the returns across subfields, we first utilized the concordance 
table developed by Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005), and then mapped the subfields in VentureXpert 
into SICs. Data on monthly stock prices came from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) database. In robustness tests, we calculate exogenous technological uncertainty using the 
21 
 
product market uncertainty in the focal venture’s subfield (Bergh, 1998; Bergh and Lawless, 1998) 
and received similar results. 
Technological Distance between the venture and its acquirer is calculated based on their 
portfolio of patents over the most recent five years, and then is defined as the Euclidean distance 
between the firms’ portfolios of three-digit patent classes categorized by the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO), weighted by the number of patents in individual patent classes 
(e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003). Before forming the interactions between the 
above two variables and rivals’ M&A activity, we mean-centered the variables to reduce 
collinearity between the multiplicative terms and direct effects (Aiken and West, 1991). 
Control variables. We controlled for many other factors such as the dollar amount of the 
focal venture’s financial resources, its technology capabilities, characteristics of its top 
management team, and other factors that might be related to the venture’s likelihood of being 
acquired and to the independent variables discussed above. In particular, we first controlled for the 
venture’s Firm Age, using the number of years from the technology venture’s founding date to 
each spell to capture the information available to acquirers (e.g., Davila, Foster, and Gupta, 2003; 
Sanders and Boivie, 2004), and the liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965). Second, VC's Early 
Investment Stage dummy denotes whether there is a VC fund focusing on the early stage among 
the investors of the technology venture in VentureXpert’s classification. We calculated the Number 
of Rounds by tracking the number of financing rounds that the venture had successfully completed 
up until each spell (e.g., Guler, 2007; Li, 2008) to capture the venture’s prospects and associated 
uncertainty. We also tracked information on each venture’s clinical stage by referring to IMS 
Health’s R&D Focus database (e.g., Hoang and Rothaermel, 2010), and calculated the Ratio of 
Venture’s Products at Early Stage in the venture’s product portfolio. A venture’s technological 
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accomplishments through its patenting activity is measured by its Citation-Weighted Patent Stock 
by tracing the number of forward citations that a patent received in the subsequent years (e.g., 
Griliches, 1981; Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005). All the patent information was collected from 
the USPTO database. Additionally, we measured the focal venture’s Alliance Prominence based 
on its eigenvector centrality in the alliance network (e.g., Baum and Silverman, 2004; Benjamin 
and Podolny, 1999; Podolny, 1993, 1994), in order to consider both the direct and indirect 
connections formed by the venture. Following Bonacich (1987), we calculated the venture’s 
alliance network prominence (alliance centrality) as follows: 
(2) Alliance Prominence = ci, t (α𝑡, 𝛽𝑡) =  ∑ (α𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡𝑐𝑗,𝑡) 𝛾𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝑗=1  
where cj,t is the centrality of the technology venture i’s alliance partner j in year t,  𝛾𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is 
the relationship matrix entry indicating the number of alliances formed between firm i and firm j 
during the last five years. α𝑡 scales the measure to ensure the maximum centrality for each year is 
equal to one, whereas 𝛽𝑡 represents weighting coefficients that are set equal to three-quarters of the 
reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue of  𝛾𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  (e.g., Jensen, 2003; Podolny, 1993). We used the 
Recombinant Capital Database to identify the technology venture’s R&D alliances with other 
firms, which provides extensive information on R&D alliance activity in the biotech and 
pharmaceutical industries. To capture the venture’s relationship with VCs, we first measured 
Venture Capitalist Funding by accumulating the total USD amount of venture capital financing 
received by the venture up to the spell, using data from the VentureXpert database (e.g., Evans 
and Jovanovic, 1989). Accessing funding can be critical for a tech venture’s survival, and ventures 
facing financial constraints might be more likely to find M&A offers attractive (e.g., Ransbotham 
and Mitra, 2010). Also, prior research has established that venture capitalists’ expertise in 
identifying, evaluating, and investing in young firms makes affiliation with prominent VCs a 
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positive signal of the firm’s quality (e.g., Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Hsu, 2004, 2006). We thus 
measured Venture Capitalist Prominence by examining the eigenvector centrality of the VCs 
investing in the technology venture within VC syndicate networks (e.g., Podolny, 1993, 1994). If 
there are multiple VCs investing in a particular technology venture, we picked the maximum of 
those VCs’ centralities to denote the prominence of VCs with which the technology venture is 
affiliated (e.g., Gompers and Lerner, 1999), though similar results were obtained with mean values. 
We obtained all of the VC-related data from the VentureXpert database. In addition, we included 
three control variables for characteristics of the venture’s top management team because these 
characteristics may affect a venture’s willingness to be acquired as well as its valuation and 
performance. First, we controlled for CEO Age because older CEOs might have fewer 
opportunities to find equivalent jobs and focus more on career security (e.g., Buchholtz, Ribbens, 
and Houle, 2003; D’Aveni and Kesner, 1993), thereby affecting a venture’s likelihood of being 
acquired. Second, ventures with executives who have previous experience in the industry of the 
venture are more likely to perform well because they have more industry-specific knowledge and 
better access to industry networks (e.g., Cohen and Dean, 2005; Shane and Stuart, 2002), which 
can make ventures more attractive. Thus, we incorporated CEO Industry Experience, which 
denotes the CEO’s previous experience in the venture’s industry. Data for the above variables were 
hand-collected from multiple sources, including Mergent Online and Bloomberg Business. Third, 
the size of the top management team may reflect the collective management resources available to 
a venture and thus could have a bearing on its performance and acquisition likelihood (e.g., 
D’Aveni and Kesner, 1993). Specifically, we measured TMT Size by identifying the number of 
key executives of the venture as reported in VentureXpert. 
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Next, as we discuss earlier, we controlled for year fixed effects as we detailed above in 
detail to account for the potential influence of economy-wide, or aggregate trends. We also control 
for the number of ventures available to be acquired in the focal venture’s subfield to control for 
the mechanical relationship that as there are more ventures available to be acquired there will be 
more acquisitions in the future.  
Macroeconomic conditions. First of all, since a growing industry may entail more growth 
opportunities and thus trigger more acquisitions (e.g., Owen and Yawson, 2010), we calculated 
the sales growth rate in the biotech industry one year before each spell (In alternative models, we 
include the median absolute change in the sales growth in the industry, following Harford, 2005). 
Data for this variable are from Compustat. Second, we control for the macroeconomic shocks using 
the median absolute change in the asset turnover in the biotech industry (Harford, 2005). In 
supplementary models, we also use alternative measures of economic shocks such as median 
absolute change- in capital expenditures, in employee growth, in ROA in the venture’s industry. 
(Due to multicollinearity among these measures of macro level variables, we only include the 
median absolute change in the asset turnover, however the results are similar when we use 
alternative measures listed above). In addition, in alternative models we control for the lack of the 
availability of the liquidity in the market using the Commerical and industrial (C/I) rate spread, 
which is the spread above the FED funds rate (Harford, 2005). In unreported analyses we also 
controlled for the mean market value to book value in the industry as an indicator of the valuations 
in the industry (Harford, 2005).  
 
RESULTS  
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In this section, we provide an overview of our findings. However, we should emphasize 
that any results should be interpreted as only suggestive of imitation due to alternative explanations. 
Relatedly, we do not intend to suggest causality, because in our models we analyze and show 
within subfield level associations between the changes in the number of prior acquisitions (or 
changes in the prominence of prior acquirers) in the focal venture’s subfield targeting the venture’s 
rivals and the focal venture’s likelihood to be acquired. At the end of the results section, we present 
a number of supplemental analyses designed to explore alternative explanations for the findings.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables. There are not particularly 
large correlations among any of the independent variables, and examination of variance inflation 
factors suggested that multicollinearity is not a concern for model estimation.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
--------------------------------- 
Table 2 presents the results from the event history analysis. Model I is the baseline 
specification comprising all of the control variables. Models II, III, and IV augment Model I by 
separately adding the theoretical variables related to the number of prior acquisitions in the focal 
venture’s subfield as well as the prior acquirers’ prominence, along with their interactions with 
exogenous technological uncertainty. Models V and VI represent the full models. The coefficient 
estimate for the number of previous acquisitions in the focal venture’s subfield targeting the focal 
venture’s rivals is positive (p=0.036, p=0.05, and p=0.049 in Models II, V, and VI, respectively). 
When examining the economic significance of this effect based on Model V, we found that when 
all variables are at their means, a one standard deviation increase in the number of prior 
acquisitions in the focal venture’s subfield is associated with an increase in the focal venture’s 
hazard of being acquired by 1.98 times.  
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--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 here 
--------------------------------- 
   
The coefficient estimate for Acquirer Prominence–ROE is positive in Model III (p=0.027) 
and Model V (p=0.012). This suggests that there is a within-subfield level positive association 
between the changes in the prominence of the prior acquirers targeting the venture’s rivals in the 
subfield and the focal venture’s hazard of being acquired in the future. This positive association is 
in line with Hypothesis 2 concerning trait-based imitation. According to Model V, with all 
variables at their means, a one standard deviation increase in acquirer prominence–ROE is 
associated with an increase in the focal venture’s hazard of being acquired of by 1.5 times. In 
Models IV and VI of Table 2, the alternative size-based measure of prior acquirers’ prominence 
(acquirer prominence-total assets) yields similar positive results (p=0.013 and p=0.045 in model 
IV and Model VI, respectively). Assessment of economic significance based upon Model VI 
suggests that a one standard deviation increase in the total assets of the prior acquirers within the 
venture’s subfield is associated with an increase in the focal venture’s hazard of being acquired by 
1.65 times.  
In Table 2, Models V-VI show the coefficients of the interactions of exogenous tech 
uncertainty within the focal venture’s subfield between (i) the number of prior acquisitions 
targeting the venture’s rivals in the focal venture’s subfield and (ii) the acquirer prominence in 
these prior acquisitions (i.e., p=0.001, p=0.011, respectively in Model V where prior acquirers’ 
prominence is measured using ROE; and, p=0.045 and p=0.016, respectively in Model VI where 
prior acquirers’ prominence is measured using total assets). These findings are in line with our 
Hypotheses 3 and 4, suggesting that the positive associations between changes in the number of 
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prior acquisitions in the focal venture’s subfield (or changes in the prominence of prior acquirers 
in the focal venture’s subfield) and the venture’s likelihood of being acquired, is more pronounced 
when the exogenous technological uncertainty within the focal venture’s subfield increases 
through time. In interpreting these interaction effects, we first followed Haveman and Cohen (1994) 
and investigated their economic significance.  
With all variables at their mean values, when the exogenous technological uncertainty 
within the focal venture’s subfield increases by one standard deviation, the positive association 
between a one standard deviation increase in the number of prior acquisitions within the venture’s 
subfield and the venture’s hazard of being acquired increases by 2.9 times. With all variables at 
their mean values, when the exogenous technological uncertainty within the venture’s subfield 
increases by one standard deviation, the positive association between a one standard deviation 
increase in the prominence of prior acquirers (ROE) within the venture’s subfield and the venture’s 
hazard of being acquired increases 2.7 times.  
With all variables held at their mean plus one standard deviation levels, when the 
exogenous technological uncertainty within the focal venture’s subfield increases by one standard 
deviation, the positive within-subfield association between the one standard deviation increase in 
the number of prior acquisitions within the venture’s subfield and the venture’s hazard of being 
acquired increases by 8 times. With all variables held at their mean plus one standard deviation 
values, when the exogenous technological uncertainty within the venture’s subfield increases by 
one standard deviation, the positive within-subfield association between a one standard deviation 
increase in the prominence of prior acquirers (ROE) within the focal venture’s subfield and the 
venture’s hazard of being acquired increases by 7.4 times.  
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With all variables at their mean minus one standard deviation levels, when the exogenous 
technological uncertainty within the focal venture’s subfield increases by one standard deviation, 
the positive within-subfield association between a one standard deviation increase in the number 
of prior acquisitions within the focal venture’s subfield and the venture’s hazard of being acquired 
increases by 2.6. With all variables held at their mean minus one standard deviation values, when 
the exogenous technological uncertainty within the venture’s subfield increases by one standard 
deviation, the positive within-subfield association between one standard deviation increase in the 
prominence of prior acquirers (ROE) within the venture’s subfield and the venture’s hazard of 
being acquired increases by 1.3.  
Figure 1 illustrate that the positive within-subfield association between the changes in the 
number of prior acquisitions within the focal venture’s subfield and the focal venture’s hazard of 
being acquired is more pronounced when the exogenous tech uncertainty within the focal venture’s 
subfield increases. Figure 2 suggests that the positive within subfield association between the 
changes in the prominence of prior acquirers within the focal venture’s subfield and the focal 
venture’s hazard of being acquired is more pronounced when the exogenous tech uncertainty 
within the focal venture’s subfield increases.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 here 
------------------------------------ 
Hypotheses 5 and 6 suggest that within-subfield level associations between changes in the 
number of prior acquisitions within the venture’s subfield (changes in the prominence of the prior 
acquirers) and the venture’s likelihood of being acquired is more pronounced when technological 
distance between the focal venture and its acquirer is high. To test these two hypotheses, we split 
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the M&A hazard into two competing risks and have rerun our analyses (Allison, 1995). In Table 
3, Models I-V show the results of Cox hazard models to estimate the hazard that the focal venture 
is acquired in a high technological distance acquisition, and in Table 4 we repeated our analyses 
to estimate the hazard that the focal venture is acquired in a low technological distance acquisition, 
based upon the median value of the technological distance. Specifically, when we compare the 
coefficients of the number of prior acquisitions within the subfield targeting a venture’s rivals 
across Table 3 (high-tech distance M&As) versus Table 4 (low tech distance M&As), we see that 
the coefficients are significantly higher in high tech distance M&As (i.e., χ2=5.796, p=0.016, in 
Model I; χ2=3.093, p=0.079, in Model IV; χ2=3.937, p=0.047, in Model V). 
The estimation results also indicate that the association between the changes in the number 
of prior acquisitions within the subfield and the venture’s likelihood to be acquired is significant 
for high tech distance acquisitions (p=0.000 in Column I, p=0.028 in Column IV and p=0.002 
Column V of Table 3), but this is not the case for low tech distance deals (p=0.578, p=0.998 and 
p=0.544, in columns I, IV and V, respectively, in Table 4). We also investigated the economic 
significance of the associations between the changes in prior acquisitions within the subfield and 
the venture’s hazard of being acquired for high versus low tech distance acquisitions. At high 
technological distance, when all variables are at their means, a one standard deviation increase in 
the number of prior acquisitions within the venture’s subfield is associated with an increase in the 
focal venture’s hazard of being acquired by 2.9 times. However, the level of corresponding 
associated increase at low tech distance context is just 1.1 times.  
Similarly, the coefficients for high tech and low tech distance deals across Tables 3 and 4 
are also compared for Acquirer Prominence–ROE (i.e., χ2=4.036, p=0.045, in Model II; χ2=4.321, 
p=0.038 in Model IV) and Acquirer Prominence–Total Assets (i.e., χ2=3.955, p=0.047, in Model 
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III; χ2=1.584, p=0.208, in Model V). Assessments of economic significance support this 
observation. With all variables at their means, a one standard deviation increase in the prior 
acquirer prominence–ROE within the focal venture’s subfield is associated with an increase in the 
focal venture’s hazard of being acquired at high technological distance by 2.6 times, whereas the 
increase is 1.16 times at low tech distance. Taken together, our results therefore seem to suggest 
that the positive association between changes in the number of prior acquisitions (changes in the 
prominence of prior acquirers) within the focal venture’s subfield and the venture’s hazard of being 
acquired is more pronounced for transactions involving substantial technological distance between 
acquirers and targets.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 here 
------------------------------------ 
Turning to the control variables, several results are noteworthy (please see Table 2). The 
number of ventures in the focal venture’s subfield is positively associated with the venture’s hazard 
of being acquired (p=0.005 in model V, and p=0.013 in model VI). Taking Model VI of Table 2 
as an example, as expected, the prominence of the VCs endorsing the focal venture (p= 0.009) and 
the venture’s prominent position in alliance networks (p=0.000) are both positively associated with 
the venture hazard of being acquired. These results are in line with the suggestion that information 
generated through the venture’s prominent positions in alliance networks and its affiliation with 
prominent VCs might convey to potential acquirers that the focal firm has good quality resources 
and future prospects. On the other hand, there is a negative association between the venture’s 
hazard of being acquired and the venture’s having products at early stages (i.e., preclinical stages) 
(p=0.006). In addition, it appears that ventures that obtained technological achievements as 
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evidenced by their citation weighted patent stock are associated with a higher likelihood of being 
acquired (p= 0.038). 
Alternative Explanations   
We need to interpret above findings with caution because some alternative mechanisms 
might generate such positive associations we observe above without any social influence, or 
imitation. Below we explain our efforts to address alternative explanations that we had discussed 
in the Alternative Explanations part of the Theory.  
To begin with, to address the implications of the availability of ventures to be acquired, we 
have controlled for the number of ventures in each subfield in a given year. Second, as an 
alternative means of addressing macro level influences, we control for the macroeconomic factors 
using the median absolute change in the asset turnover rate and the industry growth rate in sales 
in the venture’s industry (Harford, 2005). This complements the control for the year dummies 
noted earlier to control for the trends in unobservable aggregate factors that might be associated 
with both the acquisition activity within the venture’s subfield and the ventures’ likelihood to be 
acquired in the future (e.g., Garcia-Pont and Nohria, 2003; Haunschild, 1993; Van den Bulte and 
Lilien, 2001; Wooldridge, 2010). In alternative models, we also control for alternative measures 
of macroeconomic shocks and the availability of liquidity in the market (Rhodes-Kropf and 
Wishvanathan, 2004) and the results are robust. To control for time invariant subfield level 
differences across subfields that might be associated with the subfield level acquisition activity 
and the venture’s own likelihood to be acquired, we use subfield fixed effects as we mentioned in 
the Methods section.  
Supplementary Analyses to address homophily/similarity between the focal venture’s 
acquirer and prior acquirers. In robustness tests we also investigated the implications of 
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homophily or similarity across acquirers. For this purpose, at first, in unreported robustness tests 
using the venture-year level data, we control for the similarities between the focal venture and the 
targets of the model acquisitions, i.e. similarities between the focal venture and its rivals that got 
acquired in prior acquisitions, using the similarities based on alliance and patenting activity, as 
well as the similarities based on the product stages. We find that the results are qualitatively similar 
(Results are available upon request). 
Second, we created a new dataset at the acquirer-venture-year level. For this purpose, for 
each year between 1982 and 2005, we have formed all possible pairs between biotech ventures 
(targets) and the firms that have acquired in the biotech industry during the past five years. We 
conducted robust logit regressions using acquirer-venture-year level data, where dependent 
variable is a dummy variable, which takes on one if the potential acquirer i of a focal venture j 
acquirers the focal venture j at year t. We have clustered error terms at the potential acquirer and 
venture level. All the right hand side variables are lagged one year. In acquirer-venture-year level 
robustness analyses, we control for the similarity between the potential acquirer of the focal 
venture (which we call “potential acquirer” from now on) and prior acquirers in the venture’s 
subfield using the following dimensions of similarity: i) product market similarity, ii) similarity in 
size and profitability, iii) technological similarity, and iv) prior alliances between the potential 
acquirer and the prior acquirers in the venture’s subfield (e.g., Ahuja, et al., 2009; Gulati, 1998). 
To the extent that potential acquirer i of a venture j and the prior acquirers in the venture’s subfield 
are similar to each other, they might have similar opportunity sets in terms of possible investment 
opportunities available to them, and hence behave similarly (Ahuja et al., 2009; Kossinets and 
Wattz, 2009; McPherson et al., 2002; Ruef et al., 2003). Using the above dimensions of similarity 
based on the prior literature, we aim to control for the association between the acquisition decisions 
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of the potential acquirer of a venture and the prior acquisition activity within a venture’s subfield 
that might be generated by homophily/similarity between the venture’s potential acquirer and prior 
acquirers in the subfield, rather than imitation. (In the Online Appendix 1-Panel A at the end, we 
describe these and other new control variables we investigated in greater detail. In Online 
Appendix1-Panel B, we report a summary of the acquirer-venture-year results).  
Acquirer-venture-year level robustness analyses suggests that even after controlling for an 
extensive set of variables to address alternative explanations, our findings are in accord with the 
hypotheses regarding frequency- and trait-based imitation, and we continue to see that the two 
dimensions of technological uncertainty are important moderators of the associations we suggest 
in our hypotheses.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Key Findings and Contributions 
In this paper, we first show that the changes in the number of prior acquisitions targeting 
the focal venture’s rivals within the focal venture’s subfield (the changes in the prominence of 
prior acquirers within the venture’s subfield) are positively associated with the focal venture’s 
likelihood to be acquired. Our findings are in line with frequency and trait based imitation. More 
importantly, we show that these positive associations are more pronounced under two conditions 
reflecting uncertainty in the technology domain:  (i) when the exogenous technological uncertainty 
within the focal venture’s subfield increases through time, and (ii) for acquisitions in which the 
technological resources and knowledge base of the focal venture is distant from those of its 
acquirer.  
We emphasize that we suggest and show associations between prior acquisition activity 
and the venture’s likelihood to be acquired, rather than establishing causal relationship. In this 
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respect, we follow a significant stream of empirical research on mimetic behavior in general as 
well as imitation in the M&A context. We also acknowledge alternative theoretical mechanisms 
such as homophily, similarity between acquirers, as well as macroeconomic factors and supply 
conditions in the M&A markets, among others and try to address them using various controls and 
robustness tests. Nonetheless, we suggest that our findings be interpreted while keeping these 
potential alternative mechanisms in mind. Below we discuss additional limitations of the study 
and directions for future research that can extend this study. 
Our paper builds upon studies on imitation in acquisition markets and contributes to this 
particular stream of research in a number of ways. First, few prior studies that have adopted an 
imitation lens in the M&A context (e.g., Haunschild and Miner, 1997), largely focus on imitation 
surrounding established, publicly-held targets. Yet, such studies have not paid much attention to 
the role of imitation when the acquisition targets are technology ventures, which are private startup 
companies in tech related industries (Lieberman and Asaba, 2006). This is noteworthy given that 
a substantial portion of the acquisitions in high tech contexts involve private targets than public 
targets. Furthermore, acquisitions involving private tech ventures in particular are a critical means 
by which the tech ventures can obtain much needed resources and acquirers can access external 
technologies. Hence, our study aims at complementing previous studies by investigating mimetic 
behavior in acquisitions targeting tech ventures.  
Second, even though the role of uncertainty in moderating the extent of imitation in 
acquiring public firms has been analyzed in previous research (e.g., Haunschild and Miner 1997), 
the studies on the moderating role of uncertainty on social influence in high-tech environments in 
general and on the technology acquisitions in particular has not received much research attention. 
For instance, the few studies on the interaction between uncertainty and imitation in the 
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acquisitions context focus on uncertainty associated with acquisitions involving public targets 
(Haunschild and Miner, 1997). However, since acquisitions involving tech ventures may entail 
substantial uncertainty related to the value and prospects of tech venture’s underlying resources, it 
is imperative to better understand the particular dimensions of uncertainty that are critical in 
moderating the extent of imitation in technology acquisitions. Hence, our paper also contributes to 
the studies on analyzing what type of uncertainties can be particularly important in shaping 
imitation in acquisitions especially in high-tech contexts.   
In addition, previous studies on imitation in acquisition markets largely ignore the role of 
transaction-specific uncertainty related to the acquirer-target level factors. For instance, prior 
studies on transaction specific uncertainty in acquisitions predominantly use dispersion in analysts’ 
estimates of a target’s expected future earnings as indicators of transaction specific uncertainty 
faced by the acquirer. However, such analyses mainly focus on target related factors only and 
analyze only public targets. This, in turn limits our understanding about what types of uncertainties 
might be critical in moderating the imitative behavior when the targets are private, and especially 
when they are technology-based companies. We suggest that technological distance can be an 
important source of transaction-specific uncertainty, and our findings demonstrate how this aspect 
of uncertainty moderates the associations between the changes in the number of acquisitions in a 
venture’s subfield (or prominence of acquirers carrying out these acquisitions) and the venture’s 
likelihood to be acquired in the future (e.g., Folta, 1998; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Makti et al., 
2010;).  
 Limitations  
One limitation of our study as well as the majority of the previous studies on imitation is 
that we show the association - not causality - between prior actions of the other firms and the 
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likelihood of similar actions in the future. This is a quite prevalent issue in imitation studies as this 
research stream has developed over the years (e.g., Haunschild, 1993; Haunschild and Miner, 1997; 
Lieberman and Asaba, 2006; Williamson and Cable, 2003). Relatedly, future studies may search 
for new research designs to study imitation in the M&A context as well as other empirical settings.  
For instance, natural experiments or lab experiments might be useful to introduce exogenous 
variation in other firms’ actions to which executives respond, and surveys might gauge the degree 
to which managers attend to social influences when making strategic decisions such as acquisitions. 
It would also be valuable to carryout fieldwork on the ways in which managers rely on imitation 
versus other remedial mechanisms to cope with uncertainty surrounding acquisitions and other 
strategic investments. Such research would enable an assessment of the relative importance of 
imitation compared to other coping mechanisms that have been studied in recent M&A research. 
Another related and common issue in imitation analyses is the presence of various 
alternative mechanisms that might also generate the association between the actions of model firms 
in the past and the likelihood of other firms’ conducting similar actions in the future (e.g., 
Haunschild, 1993; Haunschild and Miner, 1997; Guillen, 2002; Garcia-Pont and Nohria, 2002; 
Rao et al., 2001). In particular, alternative mechanisms such as homophily, or similarity between 
the focal venture’s acquirers and prior acquirers in the venture’s subfield might also lead to the 
associations we observed in this paper without any imitation mechanism per se being manifest. 
For instance, these firms might be just exposed to similar external macroeconomic trends. To 
address alternative explanations such as these, in our models we control for various factors such 
as the macroeconomic shocks or the number of ventures available to be acquired in the focal 
venture’s subfield. In addition, in robustness tests at the acquirer-target-year level analyses, we 
control for various measures of similarity between a potential acquirer of a venture and the prior 
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acquirers in the venture’s subfield. Future studies on imitation that use alternative methodologies 
we have noted above might also consider these alternative mechanisms contributing to follow-on 
acquisitions or other strategic investments.  
Future Research Directions 
Our paper also complements existing studies aimed at analyzing how firms deal with 
uncertainty associated with M&As. For instance, prior studies have shown that when faced higher 
uncertainty, acquirers may take partial equity stake (e.g., Chari and Chang, 2009; Malhotra and 
Gaur, 2013), or when a prospective acquirer and target have dissimilar technological resources and 
knowledge bases, firms may form alliances instead of engaging in acquisitions (e.g., Balakrishnan 
and Koza, 1993; Folta, 1998; Vanhaverbeke, Duysters, and Noorderhaven, 2003; Wang and Zajac, 
2007). Our paper contributes to this stream of research by finding results that are in accord with 
social influence mechanisms that acquirers might be using to cope with uncertainty surrounding 
their acquisition decisions. It would therefore be valuable and interesting in future research to 
investigate alternative coping mechanisms that firms might utilize and relatedly examine how 
imitation might affect the ways that deals are structured and implemented. For instance, it would 
be interesting to see if these remedial mechanisms substitute or complement one another, and it 
would be valuable to determine if acquisitions subject to mimetic behavior are implemented 
differently than acquisitions that firms invest in through a more deliberate investment process to 
cope with uncertainty. 
Our focus is on acquisitions involving technology ventures, in particular private startup 
companies in biotechnology, so it would be worthwhile for future studies to consider the 
generalizability of our findings to other industries and types of acquisitions. It is possible, for 
instance, that acquirers targeting high tech companies that are public might not face uncertainty to 
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the same degree, and this might lessen the extent of imitation by potential acquirers undertaking 
acquisition decisions. However, in M&A deals involving the acquisition of technologies, our 
results on the moderating role of uncertainty in the technology domain on the association between 
the changes in prior acquisition activity and the likelihood of acquisitions in the future may still 
hold and generalize to acquisitions targeting more established, public firms to the extent that 
technology related uncertainty is still prominent. Of course, other acquisitions might involve other 
facets of uncertainty than the ones we have considered here, and it would be worthwhile to see if 
mimetic behavior for other types of acquisitions is conditioned by other sources of uncertainty that 
acquirers face.   
Future studies might also analyze the role of imitation in determining other types of 
acquisitions, such as international acquisitions, to gain a more complete understanding of the role 
of imitation in M&A strategies. It is worth noting that even though there is a substantial body of 
imitation research in analyzing entry into international markets (e.g., Delios, Gaur, and Makino, 
2008; Guillen, 2002; Henisz and Delios, 2001), the role of imitation in fostering acquisitions as an 
entry mode has not yet received significant research attention. Relatedly, it could be worthwhile 
to investigate the moderating role of uncertainty associated with the political or the institutional 
environment of the foreign country in moderating the extent of social influence in international 
acquisition activities.   
Extensions could also build off our paper and investigate the role of social influence for 
other types of strategic decisions such as alliances or other inter-organizational relationships. 
Among the few studies on imitation in alliance activity, Garcia-Pont and Nohria (2002) suggest 
that firms that are in the same strategic niche might be strongly influenced by each other’s actions, 
so they might imitate one another’s alliance formation strategies. However, the role of imitation 
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in determining alliance formation in high-tech industries and the factors that moderate the extent 
of imitation is left largely unexplored. For example, considering the substantial uncertainty 
regarding the value of the underlying resources and capabilities of tech ventures (e.g., Stuart, 1998; 
Stuart et al., 1999), it would be worthwhile to investigate the role of social influence and imitation 
in determining the formation of alliances involving tech ventures. In the alliance domain as in the 
M&A context we have studied, firms might rely on various mechanisms to cope with uncertainty 
such as selecting more familiar partners (e.g., Gulati, 1998), relying on common ties to VCs or 
other organizations (Lindsey, 2008), specifying narrow scope deals (Li et al, 2008), using network 
positions as signals of potential partner’s quality (e.g., Stuart, 1998) or utilizing various contractual 
safeguards (Robinson and Stuart, 2007). Future research might consider how imitation shapes the 
role of such factors in determining the alliance formation and design.   
The degree to which mimetic behavior accounts for investments by venture capitalists 
(VCs) and corporate venture capitalists (corporate VCs) would also be a quite interesting avenue 
to pursue in future research. Mimetic behavior is suggested to be influential in VCs’ exit strategies 
(Gaba and Terlaak 2013).  However, we still do not know much about the role of imitation in 
determining the VC firms’ investment strategies in ventures in the first place. Considering that VC 
investment decisions are made under substantial uncertainty (Gompers and Lerner, 2000), one 
would expect that VC firms might infer information cues from each other’s investments, which 
might facilitate imitation in determining the VCs’ investment strategies (Lieberman and Asaba, 
2006).  Relatedly, it would be quite informative for the literature to investigate whether the highly 
reputable, or prominent, VC firms’ investment strategies are more likely to be imitated. Similarly, 
parent firms of corporate VCs might also imitate investment strategies of other corporate VC firms. 
Considering that existing studies of investment strategies of venture capital firms or corporate 
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venture capital firms did not put much emphasis on the role of imitation in affecting the venture 
capitalists’ investment strategies, we believe our paper can form a basis for future studies to 
analyze imitation and technology-related uncertainty in determining investment decisions in high-
tech industries.  We hope that our study stimulates research on imitation in other contexts such as 
these and facilitates work that considers the alternative ways in which firms cope with 
technological uncertainty when making acquisition, alliances, and other strategic investment 
decisions. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix a 
 
 
 
  
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. M&A Event 0.02 0.14          
2.  Number of prior acquisitions within the 
venture’s subfield (log) 
1.96 1.21 0.046         
3. Acquirer Prominence – ROE 0.01 0.29 0.001 -0.278        
4. Acquirer Prominence – Total Assets (log) 4.88 2.89 0.026 0.668 -0.054       
5. Technological Uncertainty (%) 62.18 50.86 0.017 0.451 -0.228 0.355      
6. Technological Distance 0.65 0.34 -0.039 -0.011 -0.010 0.019 -0.083     
7. Firm Age 7.75 25.59 -0.008 0.014 -0.015 0.008 0.008 0.014    
8. VC’s Early Investment Stage 0.53 0.50 -0.056 -0.071 0.048 -0.050 -0.075 0.063 -0.066   
9. Number of Rounds 2.69 2.27 0.047 0.047 0.003 0.038 -0.057 0.035 0.072 -0.407  
10. Ratio of Products at Preclinical Stage 0.01 0.06 -0.014 0.022 0.011 0.019 -0.009 0.019 0.018 0.013 -0.005 
11. Citation Weighted Patent Stock 0.21 0.67 0.044 0.064 -0.054 0.043 0.058 0.035 0.045 -0.117 0.201 
12. Alliance Prominence 0.01 0.04 0.019 -0.026 0.071 -0.017 -0.109 0.019 0.016 -0.072 0.165 
13. Venture Capitalist Funding 0.11 0.16 0.025 0.228 -0.099 0.144 0.152 -0.093 0.066 -0.352 0.390 
14. VC Prominence 0.17 0.30 0.043 -0.038 0.055 -0.028 -0.134 0.069 0.035 -0.172 0.325 
15. CEO Age 48.60 7.32 0.013 0.082 -0.060 0.043 0.084 0.027 0.049 -0.116 0.211 
16. CEO Industry Experience 6.47 7.04 -0.018 0.114 -0.070 0.068 0.105 0.117 -0.010 -0.043 0.018 
17. TMT Size 4.16 2.90 -0.019 0.089 -0.012 0.028 0.022 -0.057 0.065 -0.099 0.078 
18. Number of Venture in Focal Subfield (log) 5.06 1.14 0.040 0.409 -0.196 0.573 0.455 0.014 0.016 -0.051 0.027 
19. Industry Growth Rate 0.09 0.06 -0.004 -0.205 0.158 -0.011 -0.151 0.017 -0.004 0.029 0.012 
20. (Median absolute) Change of Industry 
Asset Turnover Rate 
0.01 0.01 -0.003 -0.058 0.171 0.092 -0.076 0.024 -0.005 0.018 -0.001 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix a (continued) 
 
 
Variables 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1. M&A Event           
2. Number of prior acquisitions within the 
venture’s subfield (log) 
          
3. Acquirer Prominence – ROE           
4. Acquirer Prominence – Total Assets (log)           
5. Technological Uncertainty (%)           
6. Technological Distance           
7. Firm Age           
8. VC’s Early Investment Stage           
9. Number of Rounds           
10. Ratio of Products at Preclinical Stage           
11. Citation Weighted Patent Stock -0.011          
12. Alliance Prominence 0.050 0.169         
13. Venture Capitalist Funding -0.005 0.148 0.158        
14. VC Prominence -0.009 0.091 0.171 0.241       
15. CEO Age -0.050 0.143 0.027 0.109 0.069      
16. CEO Industry Experience -0.032 -0.005 0.022 0.165 0.021 0.376     
17. TMT Size 0.036 0.045 0.143 0.267 0.126 0.043 0.173    
18. Number of Venture in Focal Subfield (log) 0.028 0.057 0.009 0.223 -0.046 0.088 0.119 0.098   
19. Industry Growth Rate 0.014 -0.036 0.031 -0.076 0.037 -0.052 -0.047 0.004 -0.201  
20. (Median absolute) Change of Industry 
Asset Turnover Rate 
0.008 -0.022 -0.030 -0.040 0.015 -0.028 -0.003 -0.008 -0.051 0.151 
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TABLE 2-Cox Regression Results a 
Parameter I II III IV V VI 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Subfield Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm Age -0.067 
(0.065) 
[0.307] 
-0.065 
(0.067) 
[0.329] 
0.001 
(0.003) 
[0.807] 
-0.058 
(0.060) 
[0.332] 
0.000 
(0.003) 
[0.882] 
-0.116 
(0.061) 
[0.055] 
VC's Early Investment Stage -0.630 
(0.211) 
[0.003] 
-0.617 
(0.212) 
[0.004] 
-0.617 
(0.208) 
[0.003] 
-0.786 
(0.222) 
[0.000] 
-0.566 
(0.213) 
[0.008] 
-0.737 
(0.238) 
[0.002] 
Number of Rounds -0.001 
(0.045) 
[0.976] 
-0.002 
(0.045) 
[0.960] 
-0.004 
(0.043) 
[0.927] 
-0.004 
(0.044) 
[0.919] 
-0.001 
(0.043) 
[0.985] 
-0.014 
(0.048) 
[0.779] 
Venture Capitalist Funding -0.705 
(0.721) 
[0.328] 
-0.725 
(0.722) 
[0.315] 
-0.503 
(0.612) 
[0.411] 
-0.666 
(0.689) 
[0.334] 
-0.506 
(0.620) 
[0.415] 
-0.925 
(0.660) 
[0.161] 
VC Prominence 0.570 
(0.254) 
[0.025] 
0.593 
(0.253) 
[0.019] 
0.498 
(0.255) 
[0.051] 
0.627 
(0.249) 
[0.012] 
0.715 
(0.251) 
[0.004] 
0.686 
(0.263) 
[0.009] 
CEO Age -0.003 
(0.015) 
[0.863] 
-0.002 
(0.015) 
[0.911] 
-0.003 
(0.014) 
[0.817] 
-0.002 
(0.015) 
[0.916] 
-0.003 
(0.015) 
[0.853] 
-0.006 
(0.016) 
[0.719] 
CEO Industry Experience -0.021 
(0.014) 
[0.123] 
-0.021 
(0.014) 
[0.116] 
-0.023 
(0.014) 
[0.110] 
-0.022 
(0.014) 
[0.117] 
-0.027 
(0.014) 
[0.062] 
-0.019 
(0.015) 
[0.190] 
TMT Size -0.072 
(0.039) 
[0.064] 
-0.069 
(0.039) 
[0.072] 
-0.080 
(0.039) 
[0.040] 
-0.068 
(0.039) 
[0.076] 
-0.066 
(0.039) 
[0.089] 
-0.052 
(0.041) 
[0.213] 
Number of Ventures in Focal Subfield 1.725 
(0.570) 
[0.003] 
1.706 
(0.567) 
[0.003] 
1.482 
(0.571) 
[0.010] 
1.709 
(0.496) 
[0.001] 
1.478 
(0.531) 
[0.005] 
1.690 
(0.680) 
[0.013] 
Industry Growth Rate 5.943 
(4.019) 
[0.139] 
5.807 
(3.598) 
[0.107] 
6.996 
(3.588) 
[0.051] 
5.446 
(3.390) 
[0.108] 
5.476 
(3.528) 
[0.121] 
1.642 
(5.766) 
[0.776] 
Change of Industry Asset Turnover Rate -6.708 
(12.010) 
[0.577] 
-8.147 
(11.425) 
[0.476] 
-6.873 
(11.537) 
[0.551] 
-3.137 
(8.256) 
[0.704] 
-1.173 
(9.286) 
[0.900] 
-5.354 
(8.770) 
[0.542] 
Technological Uncertainty -0.009 
(0.007) 
[0.229] 
-0.014 
(0.007) 
[0.050] 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
[0.516] 
-0.013 
(0.007) 
[0.052] 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
[0.254] 
-0.014 
(0.010) 
[0.193] 
Citation Weighted Patent Stock 0.205 
(0.096) 
[0.033] 
0.196 
(0.099) 
[0.048] 
0.192 
(0.093) 
[0.038] 
0.204 
(0.094) 
[0.031] 
0.204 
(0.093) 
[0.028] 
0.200 
(0.097) 
[0.038] 
Ratio of Products at Preclinical Stage -1.001 
(0.382) 
[0.009] 
-1.013 
(0.384) 
[0.008] 
-1.126 
(0.409) 
[0.006] 
-1.002 
(0.386) 
[0.009] 
-0.980 
(0.393) 
[0.013] 
-1.162 
(0.422) 
[0.006] 
Alliance Prominence 4.415 
(1.898) 
[0.020] 
4.816 
(1.974) 
[0.015] 
3.820 
(1.849) 
[0.039] 
4.377 
(1.757) 
[0.013] 
4.211 
(1.902) 
[0.027] 
5.848 
(1.572) 
[0.000] 
Number of Prior acquisitions within the 
venture’s subfield 
 0.459 
(0.219) 
[0.036] 
  0.564 
(0.288) 
[0.050] 
0.551 
(0.280) 
[0.049] 
Acquirer Prominence – ROE   1.024 
(0.464) 
[0.027] 
 1.383 
(0.552) 
[0.012] 
 
Acquirer Prominence – Total Assets     0.150 
(0.060) 
[0.013] 
 0.174 
(0.087) 
[0.045] 
Exogenous Technological Uncertainty *  
Number of prior acquisitions within the 
venture’s subfield 
 0.006 
(0.002) 
[0.006] 
  0.009 
(0.003) 
[0.001] 
0.007 
(0.003) 
[0.045] 
Exogenous Technological Uncertainty *  
Acquirer Prominence – ROE 
  0.028 
(0.010) 
[0.006] 
 0.032 
(0.013) 
[0.011] 
 
Technological Uncertainty*  
Acquirer Prominence – Total Assets 
   0.004 
(0.002) 
[0.004] 
 0.005 
(0.002) 
[0.016] 
χ2 
96.010 
[0.000] 
103.432 
[0.000] 
100.060 
[0.000] 
107.032 
[0.000] 
112.554 
[0.000] 
121.395 
[0.000] 
Log likelihood, L(β) -851.493 -847.783 -836.499 -826.856 -813.042 -813.245 
-2[L(βbaseline)- L(βi)] ~ χ2 
 7.421 
[0.025] 
29.989 
[0.000] 
49.274 
[0.000] 
76. 903 
[0.000] 
76.496 
[0.000] 
a N=7,338. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. P-values in brackets. 
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TABLE 3- 
Cox Regression Results for High Tech Distance M&As a 
Parameter I II III IV V 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Subfield Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm Age -0.022 
(0.062) 
[0.716] 
-0.090 
(0.073) 
[0.220] 
-0.112 
(0.084) 
[0.181] 
-0.011 
(0.031) 
[0.722] 
-0.141 
(0.086) 
[0.100] 
VC's Early Investment Stage -0.812 
(0.302) 
[0.007] 
-0.590 
(0.287) 
[0.040] 
-0.769 
(0.301) 
[0.011] 
-0.582 
(0.289) 
[0.044] 
-0.904 
(0.320) 
[0.005] 
Number of Rounds -0.031 
(0.056) 
[0.578] 
-0.002 
(0.064) 
[0.980] 
-0.028 
(0.065) 
[0.668] 
-0.027 
(0.057) 
[0.638] 
-0.038 
(0.063) 
[0.548] 
Venture Capitalist Funding -0.945 
(0.964) 
[0.327] 
-1.247 
(0.944) 
[0.186] 
-1.972 
(0.971) 
[0.042] 
-0.359 
(0.865) 
[0.678] 
-1.776 
(0.971) 
[0.068] 
VC Prominence 0.879 
(0.368) 
[0.017] 
0.763 
(0.413) 
[0.065] 
0.953 
(0.380) 
[0.012] 
0.715 
(0.405) 
[0.077] 
0.880 
(0.391) 
[0.024] 
CEO Age -0.011 
(0.020) 
[0.604] 
-0.011 
(0.020) 
[0.575] 
-0.007 
(0.021) 
[0.746] 
-0.009 
(0.022) 
[0.671] 
-0.002 
(0.021) 
[0.917] 
CEO Industry Experience -0.005 
(0.020) 
[0.796] 
0.006 
(0.020) 
[0.769] 
-0.012 
(0.022) 
[0.579] 
-0.009 
(0.022) 
[0.669] 
-0.006 
(0.022) 
[0.796] 
TMT Size -0.084 
(0.056) 
[0.137] 
-0.137 
(0.065) 
[0.035] 
-0.072 
(0.060) 
[0.227] 
-0.108 
(0.058) 
[0.063] 
-0.059 
(0.058) 
[0.311] 
Number of Ventures in Focal Subfield 1.397 
(0.689) 
[0.043] 
2.189 
(1.184) 
[0.064] 
0.528 
(0.320) 
[0.099] 
1.767 
(0.941) 
[0.060] 
0.837 
(0.471) 
[0.075] 
Industry Growth Rate -5.848 
(6.970) 
[0.401] 
-8.884 
(9.036) 
[0.326] 
-7.441 
(5.338) 
[0.163] 
-7.898 
(4.249) 
[0.063] 
-4.335 
(2.692) 
[0.107] 
Change of Industry Asset Turnover Rate 31.160 
(15.071) 
[0.039] 
20.421 
(10.112) 
[0.043] 
9.781 
(14.778) 
[0.508] 
45.309 
(19.123) 
[0.018] 
11.262 
(13.952) 
[0.420] 
Technological Uncertainty -0.023 
(0.008) 
[0.005] 
-0.030 
(0.073) 
[0.679] 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
[0.708] 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
[0.903] 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
[0.140] 
Citation Weighted Patent Stock 0.235 
(0.123) 
[0.056] 
0.255 
(0.108) 
[0.018] 
0.243 
(0.133) 
[0.068] 
0.203 
(0.129) 
[0.114] 
0.273 
(0.138) 
[0.047] 
Ratio of Products at Preclinical Stage -0.851 
(0.531) 
[0.109] 
-0.934 
(0.577) 
[0.106] 
-0.780 
(0.526) 
[0.138] 
-1.013 
(0.579) 
[0.080] 
-1.015 
(0.576) 
[0.078] 
Alliance Prominence 4.467 
(2.301) 
[0.052] 
5.320 
(2.337) 
[0.023] 
5.909 
(2.363) 
[0.012] 
3.950 
(2.313) 
[0.088] 
4.333 
(1.911) 
[0.023] 
Number of prior acquisitions within the 
venture’s subfield 
1.015 
(0.251) 
[0.000] 
  0.881 
(0.402) 
[0.028] 
1.251 
(0.406) 
[0.002] 
Acquirer Prominence – ROE  4.280 
(1.480) 
[0.004] 
 3.261 
(1.249) 
[0.009] 
 
Acquirer Prominence – Total Assets    0.385 
(0.100) 
[0.000] 
 0.292 
(0.110) 
[0.008] 
χ2 
77.668 
[0.000] 
87.543 
[0.000] 
75.165 
[0.000] 
88.264 
[0.000] 
83.606 
[0.000] 
Log likelihood, L(β) -400.394 -357.010 -359.196 -353.527 -344.842 
a N=7,338. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. P-values in brackets. 
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TABLE 4 
Cox Regression Results for Low Tech Distance M&As a 
Parameter I II III IV V 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Subfield Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm Age 0.002 
(0.003) 
[0.479] 
0.002 
(0.003) 
[0.489] 
0.004 
(0.002) 
[0.043] 
0.004 
(0.003) 
[0.110] 
0.003 
(0.003) 
[0.334] 
VC's Early Investment Stage -0.805 
(0.311) 
[0.010] 
-0.791 
(0.310) 
[0.011] 
-0.659 
(0.318) 
[0.038] 
-1.070 
(0.372) 
[0.004] 
-0.706 
(0.325) 
[0.030] 
Number of Rounds -0.021 
(0.067) 
[0.748] 
-0.018 
(0.066) 
[0.783] 
-0.020 
(0.076) 
[0.792] 
-0.014 
(0.070) 
[0.836] 
-0.016 
(0.071) 
[0.817] 
Venture Capitalist Funding -0.276 
(0.861) 
[0.748] 
-0.232 
(0.839) 
[0.782] 
-0.580 
(1.072) 
[0.588] 
-1.214 
(0.902) 
[0.178] 
-0.295 
(0.915) 
[0.747] 
VC Prominence 0.394 
(0.331) 
[0.234] 
0.408 
(0.327) 
[0.213] 
0.434 
(0.351) 
[0.217] 
0.437 
(0.389) 
[0.261] 
0.366 
(0.345) 
[0.288] 
CEO Age 0.009 
(0.021) 
[0.666] 
0.009 
(0.021) 
[0.662] 
0.019 
(0.022) 
[0.393] 
0.011 
(0.024) 
[0.662] 
0.010 
(0.022) 
[0.632] 
CEO Industry Experience -0.034 
(0.019) 
[0.076] 
-0.034 
(0.019) 
[0.080] 
-0.028 
(0.019) 
[0.150] 
-0.039 
(0.023) 
[0.095] 
-0.023 
(0.019) 
[0.232] 
TMT Size -0.054 
(0.055) 
[0.323] 
-0.053 
(0.055) 
[0.333] 
-0.119 
(0.059) 
[0.043] 
-0.029 
(0.055) 
[0.602] 
-0.073 
(0.061) 
[0.226] 
Number of Ventures in Focal Subfield 2.347 
(1.318) 
[0.075] 
1.783 
(0.938) 
[0.057] 
3.512 
(1.498) 
[0.019] 
1.480 
(0.689) 
[0.032] 
1.210 
(0.832) 
[0.146] 
Industry Growth Rate 9.388 
(4.706) 
[0.046] 
3.686 
(5.887) 
[0.531] 
9.883 
(4.969) 
[0.047] 
6.187 
(3.816) 
[0.105] 
4.558 
(3.989) 
[0.253] 
Change of Industry Asset Turnover Rate -13.730 
(6.857) 
[0.046] 
-15.934 
(10.946) 
[0.145] 
-17.263 
(11.023) 
[0.117] 
-20.421 
(14.728) 
[0.165] 
-19.835 
(13.324) 
[0.136] 
Technological Uncertainty -0.032 
(0.059) 
[0.581] 
-0.013 
(0.039) 
[0.741] 
-0.078 
(0.067) 
[0.244] 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
[0.537] 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
[0.588] 
Citation Weighted Patent Stock 0.185 
(0.126) 
[0.143] 
0.203 
(0.122) 
[0.096] 
0.233 
(0.125) 
[0.062] 
0.276 
(0.125) 
[0.027] 
0.103 
(0.139) 
[0.456] 
Ratio of Products at Preclinical Stage -0.882 
(0.528) 
[0.095] 
-0.854 
(0.530) 
[0.108] 
-2.192 
(0.977) 
[0.025] 
-1.250 
(0.713) 
[0.080] 
-0.843 
(0.538) 
[0.117] 
Alliance Prominence 4.026 
(2.375) 
[0.090] 
4.062 
(2.273) 
[0.074] 
9.043 
(2.385) 
[0.000] 
5.316 
(2.080) 
[0.011] 
4.720 
(2.332) 
[0.043] 
Number of prior acquisitions within the 
venture’s subfield 
0.145 
(0.260) 
[0.578] 
  
0.001 
(0.298) 
[0.998] 
0.205 
(0.337) 
[0.544] 
Acquirer Prominence – ROE 
 
1.145 
(0.495) 
[0.021] 
 
0.509 
(0.439) 
[0.247] 
 
Acquirer Prominence – Total Assets  
  
0.134 
(0.077) 
[0.083] 
 
0.123 
(0.077) 
[0.107] 
χ2 58.035 
[0.011] 
59.075 
[0.005] 
73.809 
[0.000] 
67.509 
[0.000] 
61.079 
[0.001] 
Log likelihood, L(β) -420.196 -419.678 -362.382 -324.160 -355.718 
a N=7,338. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. P-values in brackets. 
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Figure 1. Prior acquisition activity within the venture’s subfield and Exogenous Technological 
Uncertainty 
 
 Figure 2. Acquirer Prominence–ROE and Technological Uncertainty 
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Online Appendix 1-Panel A. Explanation of additional variables used in robustness tests at the acquirer-
venture (target)-year level data.  
Methodology. For each year between 1982 and 2005, we have formed all possible pairs between biotech 
ventures (targets) and the firms that have acquired in the biotech industry during the past five years. We 
conducted robust logit regressions using acquirer-venture-year level data. We have clustered error terms at the 
potential acquirer and venture level. All the right hand side variables are lagged one year. 
Dependent variable. Equal to one if a potential acquirer i acquirers a venture j at time t, and zero otherwise.   
Independent variables: The independent variables are; the number of prior acquisitions in the focal venture’s 
subfield (for H1); the prominence of prior acquirers in the focal venture’s subfield (for H2). The moderators are 
the exogenous tech uncertainty within the focal venture’s subfield (for H3 and H4); and the technological 
distance between the focal venture and its potential acquirer’s underlying resources and knowledge base (Makri 
et al., 2010) (for H5 and H6). (All the independent variables vary through time and are lagged one year). Below, 
we discuss the extensive list of the additional control variables we have generated for the acquirer-venture-year 
level data to better address alternative explanations. The control variables that we use for our main analyses 
reported in the tables are all kept in the acquirer-venture-year level analyses as well. 
 
Measures of similarity between focal venture’s acquirer and prior acquirers in the venture’s subfield.   
i. Product market similarity between venture’s potential acquirer and prior acquirers in the venture’s 
subfield. If the potential acquirer i of a venture j at time t and the prior acquirers within the focal venture 
j’s subfield operate in similar product markets, the potential acquirer i and prior acquirers might simply 
face similar investment opportunities and hence acquire similar targets. In that case, we might observe a 
positive association between the prior acquisition activity within the focal venture j’s subfield targeting 
the venture’s rivals and the venture j’s likelihood to be acquired by potential acquirer i, which is generated 
by the similarity between the firms rather than social influence. For this purpose, for each dyad of potential 
acquirer i and focal venture j in each year t, we calculated the total number of overlaps between the four 
digit SIC codes of the focal acquirer i and the prior acquirers within the focal venture j’s subfield (Ahuja 
et al., 2009).    
 
ii. -Lack of- Similarity in technology domain between focal venture’s potential acquirer and prior 
acquirers in the venture’s subfield. To the extent that firms operate in similar technological areas tend to 
face similar investment opportunities, as the tech similarity between a potential acquirer and prior 
acquirers increase, potential acquirer might act in similar ways to the prior acquirers in the venture’s 
subfield even without any social influence. To incorporate the (lack of) similarity, at first, for each year t, 
acquirer i and venture j, we calculated the tech distance between the focal potential acquirer i and each of 
the prior acquirers in the venture’s j’s subfield (Ahuja, 2000; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003). Then, we 
take the average of these tech distances.  
 
iii. –Lack of- similarity in size and/or profitability between focal venture’s potential acquirer and prior 
acquirers in the venture’s subfield. Similarity in size and profitability enables us to partially control for 
homophily because firm size and profitability are among the important dimensions of social stratification 
among firms (Podolny, 1993; Ahuja et al., 2009; Lieberman and Asaba, 2006). According to homophily 
mechanism, firms that are similar tend to engage in similar activities and investments, which as a result 
might have similar sizes, or similar levels of profitability. Relatedly, firms that have similar size and 
profitability might face similar opportunity sets for investment. Hence, by controlling for the similarity, 
or the lack of similarity (in size and profitability) between potential acquirer i of a venture j and prior 
acquirers in the venture j’s subfield, we partially address homophily mechanism. This, as a result enables 
us to better control for the association between changes in the prior number of acquisitions (changes in 
prior acquirers’ prominence) targeting the venture’s rivals in the subfield and the venture’s likelihood to 
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be acquired without any social influence. In our analyses, we control for the -lack of- similarity between 
potential acquirer and prior acquirers in a venture’s subfield through: 
o the difference between the total assets of the potential  acquirer of the venture and the average 
total assets of prior acquirers in the venture’s subfield.  
o the difference between the ROE of the potential  acquirer of the venture and the average ROE 
of prior acquirers in the venture’s subfield.  
 
iv. Prior alliances between the potential acquirer of the venture and the prior acquirers in the venture’s 
subfield. Homophily principle, even though it is primarily about the behaviors of individuals, might 
suggest that firms that are similar are more likely to form affiliations in the first place (Kossinets and 
Wattz, 2009; McPherson, et al., 2001; Ruef et al., 2003). To the extent that homophily requires similar 
firms to be more likely to form ties with each other, the existence of prior ties among firms can be an 
indicator of the underlying similarity in their various characteristics (Ahuja et al., 2009; Kossinets and 
Wattz, 2009; Ruef et al., 2003). Furthermore, according to homophily, firms with prior ties might face 
similar opportunity sets, and hence might act similarly without social influence (McPherson, et al., 2001). 
This suggests that firms that have prior ties might tend to behave similarly simply because the opportunity 
sets/investment sets available to them are similar. Hence, controlling for previous alliances between the 
venture j’s potential acquirer i and prior acquirers within the venture j’s subfield, helps us to control for 
the extent of homophily and related similarity between the venture’s potential acquirer and previous 
acquirers in the venture’s subfield and consequently the resulting similarity in their acquisition activities 
(Ahuja et al., 2009) without social influence.  
 
Macro level/External conditions as a source of similarity in the behavior of focal venture’s potential 
acquirer and prior acquirers in the venture’s subfield 
As an alternative mechanism, to the extent that prior acquirers in a venture’s subfield and potential acquirers of 
the focal venture are subject to similar changes/shocks in macroeconomic conditions, they might act in similar 
ways without any social influence, or imitation. Hence, we control for: 
 Macroeconomic conditions/shocks using the Median absolute change in ROA; Median absolute 
change in asset turnover and Median absolute change in employment growth in biotech industry 
along with year fixed effects (Harford, 2005; Haunschild, 2003; Ahuja et al., 2009).  
 We also control the number of ventures available to be acquirer in a subfield.  
Potential acquirer-year level controls  
 Potential acquirer’s financial slack and performance. Previous studies suggest that a firm’s  (potential 
acquirer’s) financial slack can be highly influential in affecting a firm’s actions in general and acquisition 
decisions in particular (e.g., Haleblian, McNamara, Kolev, and Dykes, 2012; Smith et al., 2001). Hence, 
we have controlled various measures of the potential acquirer’s financial slack and its prior performance 
using the firm’s debt-to equity ratio; firm’s revenue growth, growth in the number of firm’s employees 
and firm’s Tobin’s q because firms with higher valuations might be more prone to conduct acquisitions.  
 Potential acquirer’s prior performance. We also controlled for potential acquirer’s ROE as an indicator 
of the firm’s performance.  
 Potential acquirer’s patent count.  
Potential acquirer-venture-year level control variables.   
 Prior alliances between the venture and its potential acquirer.  
 Potential acquirer’s number of citations to the venture’s patents.  
 Potential acquirer’s number of prior acquisitions in venture’s subfield to incorporate the acquirer’s 
experience or inclination to engage in acquisitions in the venture’s subfield. 
 Tech distance between potential acquirer and the venture (this variable also enters as a moderator as the 
measure of transaction specific uncertainty).   
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Online Appendix 1-Panel B. The Acquirer-venture-year Level Analyses. (Dependent variable is equal to 
one if a potential acquirer i acquirers a venture j at time t. All the right hand side variables are lagged 
one year).   
 
Variable Model I Model II 
Subfield fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of prior acquisitions within the venture’s subfield 
0.047 
(0.016) 
[0.004]   
Exogenous Technological Uncertainty *  
Number of prior acquisitions within the venture’s subfield 
0.230 
(0.049) 
[0.000]  
Technological distance between venture and its potential acquirer *  
Number of prior acquisitions within the venture’s subfield 
0.031 
(0.007) 
[0.007]   
Prior Acquirer prominence-ROE 
  
0.484 
(0.198) 
[0.015] 
Exogenous Technological Uncertainty *  
Prior Acquirer prominence-ROE 
  
0.950 
(0.313) 
[0.002] 
Technological distance between venture and potential acquirer *  
Prior Acquirer prominence-ROE 
  
3.249 
(0.890) 
[0.000] 
Technological distance between the venture and potential acquirer 
-20.274 
(6.782) 
[0.003] 
-44.149 
(23.475) 
[0.060] 
Exogenous Technological Uncertainty  
-0.526 
(0.139) 
[0.000] 
-0.781 
(0.151) 
[0.000] 
Difference between the venture’s potential acquirer and prior acquirers  
within the venture’s subfield (with respect to ROE) 
-0.317 
(0.347) 
[0.360] 
-0.504 
(0.496) 
[0.309] 
Difference between the venture’s potential acquirer and prior acquirers  
within the venture’s subfield (with respect to total assets) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
-0.003 
(0.001) 
[0.012] 
Product market overlap between  the venture’s potential acquirer and prior 
acquirers within the venture’s subfield 
-0.066 
[0.028] 
[0.028] 
-0.113 
(0.033) 
[0.001] 
Total Number of prior alliances between the venture’s potential acquirer and 
the prior acquirers within the venture’s subfield 
-0.562 
(0.204) 
[0.006] 
-0.563 
(0.183) 
[0.002] 
Tech distance between the venture’s potential acquirer and the prior 
acquirers  within the venture’s subfield 
-25.015 
(6.134) 
[0.000] 
-29.747 
(6.583) 
[0.000] 
Number of ventures in the focal venture’s subfield 
0.025 
(0.013) 
[0.063] 
0.028 
(0.011) 
[0.012] 
Number of potential acquirer’s prior acquisitions in the venture’s subfield 
-0.628 
(0.657) 
[0.339] 
-0.035 
(0.563) 
[0.950] 
Potential acquirer and venture has prior alliance (dummy variable) 
20.770 
(2.338) 
[0.000] 
24.609 
(2.962) 
[0.000] 
Number of cross citations from the potential acquirer to the venture 
0.026 
(0.013) 
[0.037] 
0.049 
(0.014) 
[0.000] 
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Potential acquirer’s total patents 
0.000 
(0.010) 
[0.977] 
-0.010 
(0.011) 
[0.383] 
Potential acquirer-Tobin’s q 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
[0.423] 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
[0.163] 
Potential acquirer-ROA 
2.046 
(0.244) 
[0.121] 
3.336 
(1.650) 
[0.043] 
Potential acquirer-leverage 
7.048 
(1.564) 
[0.000] 
6.316 
(2.385) 
[0.008] 
Potential acquirer—revenue growth 
0.115 
(0.244) 
[0.637] 
0.707 
(0.302) 
[0.119] 
Potential acquirer—Asset turnover 
-0.446 
(0.470) 
[0.343] 
-0.221 
(0.385) 
[0.565] 
Potential acquirer-employee growth 
0.707 
(0.635) 
[0.265] 
0.253 
(0.584) 
[0.665] 
Venture age 
0.215 
(0.047) 
[0.000] 
0.200 
(0.044) 
[0.000] 
Venture-number patens 
0.336 
(0.383) 
[0.381] 
0.313 
(0.497) 
[0.529] 
Venture-alliance prominence 
14.033 
(8.730) 
[0.108] 
14.066 
(9.719) 
[0.418] 
Venture-early stage 
-0.532 
(0.743) 
[0.474] 
-0.332 
(0.772) 
[0.667] 
VC prominence of the venture’s investors 
1.787 
(0.987) 
[0.070] 
1.152 
(1.204) 
[0.339] 
Median absolute change in ROA in the industry 
1.005 
(0.277) 
[0.000] 
1.549 
(0.303) 
[0.000] 
Median absolute change in Asset turnover  in the industry 
1.545 
(0.403) 
[0.000] 
2.699 
(0.493) 
[0.000] 
Median absolute change in Employment growth  in the industry 
-0.729 
(0.184) 
[0.000] 
-1.198 
(0.234) 
[0.000] 
Log likelihood, L(β) -186.6 -161 
